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Abstract
We consider collective decision problems given by a prole of single-peaked
preferences dened over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be
located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a
large class of priority rules based on e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity
and sovereignty. Each such rule is described by a xed priority ordering
among interest groups. We show that any priority rule which treats agents
symmetrically anonymity, respects some form of coherence across collective
decision problems reinforcementand only depends on peak information 
peak-only, is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule denes priorities
based on the relative size of the interest groups and specic weights attached
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1 Introduction
We consider a generalization of the unidimensional voting model studied by Black
(1948), Moulin (1980), and Barberà and Jackson (1994). A collective decision prob-
lem is given by a set of agents, a prole of single-peaked preferences dened over the
real line, and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line.1 As is standard
in the mechanism design literature, we look for rules which can solve any collective
decision problem.
In this setup, Bochet and Gordon (2012) characterize a rich class of rules based
on the combination of e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity, and sovereignty.
While e¢ ciency is a standard notion, the last two properties are new. Object-
population monotonicity states that if newcomers join a collective decision problem
and, at the same time, the number of public facilities increase to compensate for
this arrival, then agents already in the initial problem cannot be hurt. Suppose next
that a single facility must be located. Sovereignty states that any location could be
chosen provided that an appropriately selected, and possibly large, interest group
defending this particular location is brought into the problem. Each rule which
jointly satises these three properties is a priority rule that selects locations based
on a xed priority ordering among interest groups.
An appealing feature of the class of priority rules is the simplicity with which
these rules can be described. However, as will be made clear in Section 3, the
class contains some rules which either give too much power to some agents, or
exhibit inconsistencies across specic collective decision problems. We suggest to
put some order in this class by imposing that a rule treat agents symmetrically 
anonymity and respect some form of coherence across collective decision problems
reinforcement.
Anonymity is a well-known property imposing that agentslabel do not matter.
Reinforcement is a property of stability with respect to merging of collective decision
problems. It states that if for two problems di¤ering possibly on the cardinality
of the set of agents and their preferences  the rule selects the same locations,
then it should be invariant for the new collective decision problem obtained by
merging the two initial problems. This property is, however, not new and already
appears in the literature on characterizations of scoring rules  see e.g. Young
(1975) or Myerson (1995). Along with a natural informational simplicity property
1By pure public facilities, we mean facilities which are non-excludable and do not su¤er from
congestion.
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peak-only , any rule in Bochet and Gordons class that satises anonymity and
reinforcement is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule denes priorities
based on specic weights attached to interest groups. The weight of any interest
group relative to another depends on their densities and most preferred locations.
The simplest example is the rule which takes into account only the density of each
interest group and gives priority to groups with the highest density. We call these
simple majoritarian rules. However, the class is much larger. For instance, a rule
can assign di¤erent weights to di¤erent interest groups based on the regions in which
they are located. Also, rules can incorporate additional features such as the distance
between the most preferred locations of the interest groups and a reference point.
So while each rule in our class is density-based, additional information can be
used.
The problem of locating multiple public facilities was rst introduced by Miya-
gawa (1998, 2001) in the case of two facilities. Ehlers (2002, 2003), Bochet and
Gordon (2012), Heo (2012), Ehlers and Gordon (2011) provide axiomatic character-
izations for this model. Umezawa (2012) considers the location of two facilities on a
tree network. Barberà and Beviá (2002, 2005) and Ju (2008) show the existence of
a rule satisfying interesting normative properties. Our main contribution to this lit-
erature is the analysis of the implications of the reinforcement axiom in this context
and the characterization of the weighted majoritarian rules.
The plan of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we introduce the model.
In Section 3, we introduce the properties we study, the class of priority rules and
provide several illustrating examples. In Section 4, we prove our central result.
Finally, we conclude in Section 5 by illustrating the richness of the characterized
class of rules.
2 The Model and Notations
There is a countably innite set N of potential agents. A population N is a nite and
nonempty subset of N. The population is collectively endowed with k  1 identical
public facilities, each to be located on the real line R. A typical location on R is
denoted by x: An assignment is a menu of locations, i.e., a nite subset X  R. A
k-assignment is an assignment for exactly k facilities, i.e., a subset X  R such that
jXj = k. Let Xk be the class of all k-assignments. In particular, a 1-assignment
is a single location x 2 R, so that X1 = R. Let X  [k1Xk be the class of all
assignments.
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Each agent i 2 N has a preference Ri over X , which is a weak ordering (reexive,
transitive and complete) over X . Let Pi and Ii be, respectively, the strict ordering
and indi¤erence relation derived from Ri. A preference Ri is single-peaked if the
following hold:
i) There is a location p (Ri), such that for all x; y 2 R satisfying either x < y 
p(Ri) or p (Ri)  y > x, we have y Pi x: The location p (Ri) is called the peak
of preference Ri:
ii) For all X; Y 2 X ; we let X Ri Y if there is x 2 X such that for all y 2 Y; we
have x Ri y.
The rst condition is the standard single-peakedness notion for preferences over
single locations on the real line. The second condition extends the preferences from
single locations to menus.2 We restrict attention to the class R of single-peaked
preferences over X .
A preference prole, RN , species a population N and the preferences of all
agents in N , i.e., RN = (Ri)i2N 2 RN . For each prole RN and each nonempty
subpopulation M  N; let RM denote the subprole (Ri)i2M . For each prole RN ,
let p(RN) be the set of peak locations for RN ; i.e., p (RN)  fp(Ri) : i 2 Ng. For
each k  1, let Pk be the set of preference proles RN such that k  jp (RN)j, i.e.,
the number of distinct peak locations in RN is at least k. A problem is a pair (k;RN)
such that k  1 and RN 2 Pk.3
A rule is a sequence f = ff1; f2; : : :g of mappings fk : Pk!Xk: For each problem
(k;RN), the rule f prescribes an assignment in Xk.4 For each k  1; the set of
mappings fk is XPkk : Therefore, the set of all rules is
Q1
k=1XPkk .
3 Main Axioms and Priority Rules
Consider a prole RN 2 RN and x; y 2 R. For all X; Y 2 X , we say that X weakly
Pareto dominates Y for prole RN , denoted by X RN Y , if X Ri Y for each i 2 N .
2There are di¤erent ways to extend preferences over points to preferences over sets. Consis-
tent with the denition of a public facility used in this paper, we consider the max-extension of
preferences used by Miyagawa (2001).
3The restriction k  jp (RN )j allows us to focus on non-trivial cases. When k > jp (RN )j ; it is
possible to locate one facility at each peak location, so that the welfare of each agent is maximized.
Locating the remaining facilities does not a¤ect any agents welfare.
4Our denitions rule out locating more than one facility at the same point. Under single-peaked
preferences, and for the class of problems we consider, Pareto-e¢ ciency would exclude duplication
anyway.
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Our rst axiom is the usual e¢ ciency axiom.
A rule f satises e¢ ciency if, for each problem (k;RN), there is no k-assignment
X such that X RN fk(RN); and X Pj fk(RN) for some j 2 N .
A prole RN is peak-unanimous if all preferences of this prole have the same
peak, i.e., p (RN) is singleton. Let T be the set of peak-unanimous proles.
A rule f satises object-population monotonicity if, for each problem (k;RN)
with k < jp(RN)j, for each peak-unanimous prole RM 2 T such that N \M = ;,
we have fk+1(RN ; RM) RN fk(RN).
A rule f satises sovereignty if, for each prole RN , each location x 2 R n
f1(RN), and each population L, there exists a peak-unanimous prole RM 2 T such
that M is disjoint from both L and N , and f1 (RN ; RM) = fxg = p (RM).
On the one hand, in the situation of a population and resource increase, object-
population monotonicity protects the rights of the rst-comers. On the other hand,
in the situation of a population increase, sovereignty protects the rights of the new-
comers.
Bochet and Gordon (2012) show that the combination of e¢ ciency, object-
population monotonicity and sovereignty characterizes a subclass of priority rules.
To dene these rules, we need to introduce a class of binary relations called pri-
orities over any nonempty subset S of T . We say that any two peak-unanimous
proles RN and RM are non-overlapping if they have distinct peaks and disjoint
populations, i.e., p (RN) 6= p (RM) and N \M = ;. The binary relation  over S
is almost complete if for all RN ; RM 2 S, we have (RN  RM or RM  RN) ()
(RN and RM are non-overlapping).5 It is almost transitive if for all prolesRN ; RM ; RL 2
S; such thatRN andRL are non-overlapping, we have (RN  RM and RM  RL) =)
(RN  RL). The binary relation  is a priority over S if it is asymmetric, almost
transitive and almost complete.6 For each nonempty S  T ; let PS be the set of
priorities over S:
For any prole RN , the peak-unanimous subprole RM of RN is maximal if
p(RM)\p
 
RNnM

= ;. Since any two distinct maximal peak-unanimous subproles
5In particular, an almost complete binary relation  over T is never reexive.
6A priority  is not a partial order, as it is not fully transitive. However, priorities have the
following important property. The restriction of a priority  on any set S of peak-unanimous and
non-overlapping proles is a strict ordering. If this set is nite, the priority  has a greatest (or top)
element in S. A top element for  typically does not generally exist on a set of peak-unanimous
proles whose elements are not non-overlapping, even if it is a nite set.
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are non-overlapping, the set of maximal peak-unanimous subproles of some prole
can be strictly ordered by any priority.
For each 2 PT , the priority rule f associated with  is dened as follows. Let
(k;RN) be a problem. The priority  strictly ranks the maximal peak-unanimous
subproles in the decomposition of RN and fk(RN) selects the peak locations of
the top k maximal peak-unanimous subproles for . That is, fk(RN) is the k-
assignment such that fk(RN)  p(RN), and for all two maximal peak-unanimous
subproles RM and RL in RN , if p(RM)  fk(RN) and p(RL) ( fk(RN), then
RM  RL. Let F be the class of priority rules.
We now introduce two properties that a priority ordering may satisfy. A priority
 is almost monotonic if there are no four peak-unanimous proles RM , RK , RH
and RL such that p (RM) = p (RL), M \ L = ;, RK and RH are non-overlapping,
RM  RH  RM[L; and RM  RK  RM[L. A priority  is sovereign if the
following two conditions hold. (i) For all peak-unanimous RH ; RK such that RH 
RK ; and for any population L, there exists a peak-unanimous prole RM such that
M is disjoint from K and L; and satises p (RM) = p (RK) and RK[M  RH . (ii)
For each peak-unanimous prole RH , each x 6= p (RH) and each population L, there
exists a peak-unanimous prole RM such that M \ L = ;, and satises p (RM) = x
and RM  RH .
Next, we provide an example of a priority that is not sovereign.
Example 1 Left-peaks priority / Right-peaks priority
A priority  is the left-peaks priority if for all non-overlapping proles RM ; RN 2 T ,
we have RM  RN () p(RM) < p(RN). Similarly,  is the right-peaks priority
if for all non-overlapping proles RM ; RN 2 T , we have RM  RN () p(RM) >
p(RN). 
We now state Bochet and Gordon (2012)s central result.
Theorem 1 A rule f satises e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity and sov-
ereignty if and only if it is a priority rule whose priority is almost monotonic and
sovereign.
The proof of this result can be found in Bochet and Gordon (2012). We now
give examples of priorities attached to rules described in Theorem 1.
Example 2 Hierarchical priorities
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A priority  is hierarchical if the following holds: (i) There is a weak ordering
D of all agents in N, such that, for all non-overlapping proles RL, RM 2 T , if
there exists i 2 L, such that for all j 2 M , we have (i D j and not j D i), then
RL  RM . (ii) For each D-indi¤erence class K, consider the class TK of peak-
unanimous proles RM such that the agents in M who are ranked highest according
to D belong to K. On each such class TK, the priority coincides with either the
left-peaks or the right-peaks priority. If each D-indi¤erence class is a singleton, the
priority is a serial dictatorship. Also, if there is a single D-indi¤erence class, the
priority is either the left-peaks or the right-peaks priority. 
Note that a hierarchical priority, as described in Example 2, is sovereign (and
therefore satises all the properties in Theorem 1) if and only if the weak ordering
D has no maximal element.
Example 3 Simple majoritarian priorities
A priority  is simple majoritarian if for all non-overlapping RL, RM 2 T , we
have jLj > jM j ) RL  RM . For each n  1, the tie-breaking rule n within each
class of the form Tn = fRN 2 T : jN j = ng can be given by any strict ordering over
locations in R. For example, we could require n to be the left-peaks priority for all
n (left majoritarian priority) or the right-peaks priority for all n (right majoritarian
priority). 
Unlike the rules described by simple majoritarian priorities, the rules described
by hierarchical priorities allow for an asymmetric treatment of agents, i.e., agents
labels matter. We would like rules to respect an anonymous treatment of agents
preferences.
A rule f satises anonymity if for all k  1 and problems (k;RN) and (k;R0M)
such that for allR 2 R, jfi 2M : R0i = Rgj = jfi 2 N : Ri = Rgj, we have fk(RN) =
fk(R
0
M).
Anonymity imposes an additional requirement on priorities. A priority  is
anonymous if it satises the following condition. For all RM ; RN ; R0M 0 ; R
0
N 0 2 T ;
such that (i) RM and RN are non-overlapping, (ii) R0M 0 and R
0
N 0 are non-overlapping,
(iii) for all R 2 R; we have jfi 2M : Ri = Rgj = jfi 2M 0 : R0i = Rgj ; (iv) for all
R 2 R; we have jfi 2 N : Ri = Rgj = jfi 2 N 0 : R0i = Rgj ; the following equivalence
holds, RM  RN () R0M 0  R0N 0 .
Bochet and Gordon (2012) characterized the subclass of anonymous priority
rules. We state it below and omit its straightforward proof.
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Theorem 2 Let f be a priority rule. Then f satises anonymity if and only if its
priority is anonymous.
Notice that if anonymity is dropped, the class of rules which satisfy e¢ ciency,
object-population monotonicity and sovereignty will include rules whose priorities
combine Examples 2 and 3 in interesting ways. We give below two such examples.
Example 4 Majoritarian-hierarchical priorities
Let D be a weak ordering over agents in N, such that for all i; j; i < j =) j D i
and, in addition, D has no maximal element. Construct the partition of N into
indi¤erence classes Z1; Z2; :::: according to D. That is, for each i; j 2 Zk, i D j and
j D i. In addition, for each i 2 Zk, j 2 Z` with k < `, we have j D i.
A priority  is a majoritarian-hierarchical priority if there is an index u dened on
the class of all populations; such that for each population M  N, u is dened as,
u(M) = jM j+ (1  )max fk 2 N : Zk \M 6= ;g
for  2 (0; 1), and for all non-overlapping RM ; RN 2 T , we have that u(M) >
u(N) =) RM  RN . For each v > 0, the tie-breaking rule v within each class
of the form Tv = fRN 2 T : u(N) = vg is either the left-peaks or the right-peaks
priority. 
Example 5 Hierarchical weighted majoritarian priorities
A priority  is a hierarchical weighted majoritarian priority if there exists a list of
weights (!i)i2N 2 RN with 1X
i=1
!i = +1;
such that for all non-overlapping RM ; RN 2 T , we haveX
i2M
!i >
X
i2N
!i =) RM  RN :
For cases where equality holds, the tie-breaking rule  within each v level curve of
the form fRN 2 T :
P
i2N !i = vg is determined by some strict ordering B over
locations, independent of v.7 
In Bochet and Gordon (2012), it is shown that the set of priority rules described
by hierarchical priorities is equivalent to the set of strategy-proof priority rules.
7Note that a tie-breaking rule may not be needed if equality never holds for any two non-
overlapping peak-unanimous proles.
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In contrast, there are only two hierarchical priorities that are anonymous: left-
peaks and right-peaks priorities. But left-peaks and right-peaks priorities are not
sovereign. Thus, anonymity, sovereignty and strategy proofness are mutually incon-
sistent within the class of priority rules. If we do not impose anonymity, then the
class of rules characterized by all other properties (i.e. e¢ ciency, object-population
monotonicity, sovereignty, reinforcement and peak-only) will include every hierar-
chical rule whose associated priority is sovereign.8 Adding anonymity excludes rules
like serial dictatorship that violate the pure notion of majoritarianism. But it also
excludes some rules which balance agentspriorities with the notion of majoritari-
anism e.g. the priority introduced in Example 5.9
We now introduce additional examples of priority rules which also satisfy anonymity.
Example 6 Two-regions majoritarian priorities
A priority  is two-regions majoritarian if there is a location x0 2 R (that separates
the two regions), and a coe¢ cient x0 2 (0; 1] such that, for all non-overlapping RM ;
RN 2 T ; if either (i) p(RM) < x0  p(RN) and x0 jM j > jN j or (ii) p(RN) < x0 
p(RM) and jM j > x0 jN j or (iii) p(RM); p(RN) 2 ( 1; x0), or p(RM); p(RN) 2
[x0;+1) and jM j > jN j hold, then RM  RN : For each v  x0, the tie-breaking
rule v within each class of the form
Tv = fRN 2 T : p(RN)  x0, jN j = vg [ fRN 2 T : p(RN) < x0, x0 jN j = vg
can be given by any strict ordering over locations in R. For example, we could require
v to be the left-peaks priority for all Tv (left-two-regions majoritarian priority) or
the right-peaks priority for all Tv (right-two-regions majoritarian priority). 
Example 7 Centralist majoritarian priorities
A priority  is centralist majoritarian if there is a location x0 2 R (the center) and
an index u : f1; 2; :::gR+ ! R, where u (n; d) is weakly increasing in n and weakly
decreasing in d, with limn!+1 u (n; d) = +1, such that for all non-overlapping RM ;
RN 2 T ; we have
u (jM j ; jp (RM)  x0j) > u (jN j ; jp (RN)  x0j)) RM  RN :
8Suppose we do not impose anonymity but add strategy-proofness instead to e¢ ciency, object-
population monotonicity and sovereignty. The class of rules characterized by these four axioms
coincides with hierarchical rules whose priorities are sovereign. Notice that hierarchical priority
rule whose priorities are sovereign satisfy reinforcement and peak-only. Adding reinforcement and
peak-only has thus no rening e¤ect on this characterization.
9The priority in Example 4 does not satisfy both anonymity and reinforcement.
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For each v 2 R, the tie-breaking rule v within each class of the form
Tv = fRN 2 T : u (jN j ; jp (RN)  x0j) = vg
can be any strict ordering over locations in R. For example, we could require v
to be the left-peaks priority for all Tv (left-centralist majoritarian priority) or the
right-peaks priority for all Tv (right-centralist majoritarian priority). 
There are many possible functions u for a centralist majoritarian priority rule.
For example, with
u (n; d) =
(
n
+d
if n  2
max

n; 2
+d
	
if n > 2,
where  > 0, the priority rule f behaves across problems in a way that is not
coherent. That is, if for two problems  di¤ering possibly on the cardinality of
the set of agents, and on preferences the rule selects the same locations, then the
selection operated by f may change for the new collective decision problem obtained
by merging the two initial problems. For instance, let x0 = 1,  = 0:1 and consider
the problems (1; RM) and (1; RL) with M \ L = ;, M = H [K, jHj = 1, jKj = 2,
p(RH) =
1
2
, p(RK) = 3; L = H 0[K 0, jH 0j = 2, jK 0j = 3, p(RH0) = 12 , p(RK0) = 3. It
is easy to see that, given u, f1(RM) = f1(RL) = f12g. However, f1(RM [RL) = f3g.
We are interested in rules with the following coherence property: if two problems
deliver the same location(s), the problem obtained from merging them still delivers
the same location(s).
A rule f satises reinforcement if for all k  1 and each pair of proles RN ,
RM such that N \M = ;, if fk(RN) = fk(RM) = X then fk(RN [RM) = X.
That is, whenever any two di¤erent problems (k;RN) and (k;RM) select the
same k locations, then reinforcement requires that the location of the k facilities
should not change in the problem (k;RN [RM).
We add one last property that will be used for our main result.
A rule f satises peak-only if for all k  1 and problems (k;RN) and (k;R0N),
if p(Ri) = p(R0i) for all i 2 N , then fk(RN) = fk(R0N).
Peak-only is an informational simplicity requirement which states that only the
information regarding the peaks of agents should be used. It is, however, a strong
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assumption as it ignores every other aspect of agentspreference orderings. Never-
theless, if we do not impose peak-only, then the class of priority rules characterized
by all other properties (i.e. e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity, sovereignty,
anonymity and reinforcement) will include rules that put arbitrary weights on pref-
erence orderings. This forms a rich class of rules where weights can depend in
complicated ways on the full preference relations. Examples of such rules are those
described by the following priorities:
Example 8 Symmetry biased majoritarian priorities
We say that a single-peaked preference Ri is symmetric if for all x; y 2 R, we have
xRiy () jx  p(Ri)j  jy   p(Ri)j. For any peak-unanimous prole RN 2 T , let
(RN) be the number of agents i 2 N such that Ri is symmetric.
A priority  is symmetry biased majoritarian if there is  > 0 such that for all
non-overlapping RL, RM 2 T , we have (RL) + jLj > (RM) + jM j ) RL 
RM . For each n  1, the tie-breaking rule n within each class of the form Tn =
fRN 2 T : (RN) + jN j = ng can be given by any strict ordering over locations in
R. For example, we could require n to be the left-peaks priority for all n or the
right-peaks priority for all n. 
Thus, imposing peak-only excludes undesirable rules like those described by
symmetry biased majoritarian priorities. Our position here is that peak-only is a rel-
evant requirement when agentspeaks (but not preferences) are commonly known.
Indeed, in many instances, peak information is di¢ cult to manipulate because it
reects some observable attributes e.g. because it reects an agents address. Un-
der this interpretation, peak-only is an invariance condition with respect to some
preference change.10
4 A Characterization of Weighted Majoritarian
Rules
We now introduce a family of priority rules that we call weighted majoritarian rules.
Let R++ and Q++ respectively be the set of positive reals and the set of positive
rationals.
10But then, notice that the requirement of strategy-proofness in this model may not be appro-
priate. Indeed, if peaks are veriable, a weakening of strategy-proofness is called for. Sakai and
Wakayama (2012) introduce such a weakening, strategy-proofness for same peaks, which preclude
manipulations of preference relations around the true peak. Notice that strategy-proofness for
same peaks is implied by peak-only.
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A priority is aweighted majoritarian priority if there exists an asymmetric
and transitive binary relation, i.e. a strict partial order . on R; and a function q :
R2 ! R++ with q(x; y)q(y; x) = 1, q(x; z) = q(x; y)q(y; z); and q (x; y) 2 Q++ ()
(either x.y or y.x); for all distinct x; y and z, such that for any two non-overlapping
peak-unanimous proles RM and RL, we have RM  RL if either
1. jM jjLj > q(p(RM); p(RL)), or
2. jM jjLj = q(p(RM); p(RL)) and p(RM) . p(RL).
Note that the tie-breaking rule . is only needed if the image of q contains at
least one rational number; otherwise, the equality jM jjLj = q(p(RM); p(RL)) does not
hold for any two peak-unanimous proles RM and RL.
Theorem 3 A rule f satises e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity, sovereignty,
anonymity, reinforcement and peak-only if and only if there exists a weighted ma-
joritarian priority  such that f is priority rule associated with .
Proof. It is straightforward to prove the if part, i.e., if there exists a weighted
majoritarian priority  such that f is a priority rule associated with , then f
satises all the axioms listed in the theorem. We prove the only if part.
It follows fromTheorem 1 that if f satises e¢ ciency, object-population monotonic-
ity and sovereignty, then there exists a priority  such that f is a priority rule
associated with . We show that  is a weighted majoritarian priority.
Pick any two locations x; y 2 R such that x > y.
Step 1. Let RM ; R0N ; RK ; R
0
L be four peak-unanimous preference proles such
that p(RM) = p(R0N) = x, p(RK) = p(R
0
L) = y, jM j = jN j, jLj = jKj, and
both pairs (RM ; RK) and (R0N ; R
0
L) are non-overlapping. By e¢ ciency f1(RM) =
f1(R
0
N) = fxg and f1(RK) = f1(R0L) = fyg. By peak-only and anonymity, we get
that f1(RM ; RK) = f1(R0N ; R
0
L)  fx; yg, where the set inclusion follows because f
is a priority rule.
Pick a (n1; n2) 2 Z2+n(0; 0), where Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers. If n1 > 0
and n2 = 0, then let RN1 be any peak-unanimous prole such that p(RN1) = x and
jN1j = n1. If n1 = 0 and n2 > 0, then let RN2 be any peak-unanimous prole such
that p(RN2) = y and jN2j = n2. If n1; n2 > 0, then let (R0N1 ; R0N2) be any pair of
peak-unanimous and non-overlapping proles such that p(R0N1) = x, p(R
0
N2
) = y,
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jN1j = n1 and jN2j = n2. Dene
gxy(n1; n2) =
8><>:
f1(RN1); if n2 = 0
f1(RN2); if n1 = 0
f1(R
0
N1
; R0N2); if n1; n2 > 0.
The argument in the previous paragraph implies that gxy is a well-dened function
over the domain Z2+n(0; 0).
Now, we extend the domain of g(x;y) from Z2+n(0; 0) to Q2+n(0; 0), where Q+ is the
set of nonnegative rational numbers. For any positive integer n dene gxy
 
n1
n
; n2
n

=
gxy(n1; n2). This is well-dened because for any two
 
n1
n
; n2
n

=

n01
n0 ;
n02
n0

, we have
gxy
n1
n
;
n2
n

= gxy(n1; n2) = gxy

n n01
n0
;
n n02
n0

= gxy(nn01; nn02) = gxy(n01; n02);
where the last equality follows from reinforcement. Note that by this extension, gxy
is dened for any pair of rational numbers (q1; q2) 2 Q2+n(0; 0) since any such (q1; q2)
equals
 
z1
z
; z2
z

, where z1; z2 are nonnegative integers while z is a positive integer.
Pick any
 
n1
n
; n2
n

,

n01
n0 ;
n02
n0

2 Q2+n(0; 0) such that n1n < n
0
1
n0 and
n2
n
=
n02
n0 . We argue
that if gxy
 
n1
n
; n2
n

= fxg, then gxy

n01
n0 ;
n02
n0

= fxg. To prove this, let ~n1
~n
=
n01
n0   n1n .
Now,
gxy

n01
n0
;
n02
n0

= gxy(n
0
1; n
0
2) = gxy (n ~n n01; n ~n n02)
= gxy (n
0(~n n1 + ~n1  n); n0  ~n n2)
= gxy (~n n1 + ~n1  n; ~n n2)
= gxy ((~n n1; ~n n2) + (~n1  n; 0)) ;
where the second and the fourth equalities follow from reinforcement. However,
gxy(~nn1; ~nn2) = gxy(n1; n2) = gxy
 
n1
n
; n2
n

= fxg (the rst equality follows from
reinforcement) and gxy(~n1  n; 0) = fxg. Once again, reinforcement implies that
gxy ((~n n1; ~n n2) + (~n1  n; 0)) = fxg and so we are done.
Step 2. Dene
q+(x; y) = supfq1 2 Q+ : gxy(q1; 1) = fygg
q (x; y) = inffq1 2 Q+ : gxy(q1; 1) = fxgg:
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We argue that1 > q+(x; y) = q (x; y) > 0. It is easy to see that q+(x; y) <1 since
sovereignty implies that there exists an integer n1 > 0 such that gxy(n1; 1) = fxg
and the last result in Step 1 implies that gxy(q1; 1) = fxg for all rational q1  n1.
Likewise, q (x; y) > 0 since sovereignty implies that there exists an integer n2 > 0
such that gxy(1; n2) = fyg. However, gxy(1; n2) = gxy

1
n2
; 1

and so the last result
in Step 1 implies that gxy(q1; 1) = fyg for all rational q1  1n2 .
It must be that q+(x; y)  q (x; y) because otherwise there exists a q1 2 Q+
such that q (x; y) < q1 < q+(x; y). If gxy(q1; 1) = fxg, then the last result in
Step 1 implies that gxy(q01; 1) = fxg for all q01 > q1 and therefore, we must have
q+(x; y)  q1, a contradiction. Similarly, if gxy(q1; 1) = fyg, then gxy(q01; 1) = fyg
for all q01 < q1 and therefore, we must have q1  q (x; y), a contradiction. Now,
suppose q+(x; y) < q (x; y) and let q1 2 Q+ such that q+(x; y) < q1 < q (x; y).
By denition of q+(x; y), it must be that gxy(q1; 1) = fxg whereas by denition of
q (x; y) it must be that gxy(q1; 1) = fyg, a contradiction. Hence, we conclude that
q+(x; y) = q (x; y).
Dene q(x; y) = q+(x; y) = q (x; y) and q(y; x) = 1
q(x;y)
. Next, dene the binary
relation . as follows: if q(x; y) is irrational, then x and y are not comparable for .: If
q(x; y) is rational and gxy(q(x; y); 1) = fxg, then x . y, whereas if q(x; y) is rational
and gxy(q(x; y); 1) = fyg, then y . x.
Step 3. Pick any two peak-unanimous and non-overlapping proles RM and RL
such that p(RM) = x and p(RL) = y. Since f is a priority rule associated with ,
we know that f1(RM ; RL) = fxg () RM  RL.
In Step 1, we have argued that f1(RM ; RL) = gxy(jM j; jLj) = gxy

jM j
jLj ; 1

.
By denition of the function q(:; :), it follows that if jM jjLj > q(x; y) (or equivalently
jLj
jM j < q(y; x)), then gxy

jM j
jLj ; 1

= fxg and therefore, RM  RL. Similarly, if
jM j
jLj < q(x; y) (or equivalently
jLj
jM j > q(y; x)), then gxy

jM j
jLj ; 1

= fyg and therefore,
RL  RM . Finally, if jM jjLj = q(x; y) (or equivalently jLjjM j = q(y; x)), then x . y ()
gxy(q(x; y); 1) = fxg () RM  RL.
Step 4. Next, we argue that q(x; z) = q(x; y)q(y; z);8x 6= y 6= z. Let

n1(n)
~n1(n)
1
n=1
be a sequence of rational numbers such that n1(n)
~n1(n)
 q(x; y) and limn!1 n1(n)~n1(n) =
q(x; y). Similarly, let

n2(n)
~n2(n)
1
n=1
a sequence of rational numbers such that n2(n)
~n2(n)

q(y; z) and limn!1
n2(n)
~n2(n)
= q(y; z). Let RMn , RLn and RKn be three peak-unanimous
and non-overlapping proles such that p(RMn) = x, p(RLn) = y and p(RKn) = z,
and jMnj = nn1(n)n2(n)+ 2n1(n)n2(n), jLnj = nn2(n) ~n1(n)+n2(n)
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and jKnj = n ~n1(n) ~n2(n). Consider the problem (1; (RMn ; RLn ; RKn)). We have
jMnj
jLnj =
nn1(n)n2(n)+2n1(n)n2(n)
nn2(n)~n1(n)+n2(n) >
n1(n)
~n1(n)
 q(x; y) and jLnjjKnj =
n2(n)
~n2(n)
+ n2(n)
n~n1(n)~n2(n) >
q(y; z). Therefore, from the arguments in Step 3, it follows that RMn  RLn and
RLn  RKn . Then we must have RMn  RKn since  is a priority, which is al-
most transitive. This implies that jMnjjKnj  q(x; z);8n. However, limn!1
jMnj
jKnj =
q(x; y)q(y; z), and therefore, q(x; y)q(y; z)  q(x; z). We can similarly argue that
q(z; y)q(y; x)  q(z; x) =) 1
q(z;x)
 1
q(z;y)
1
q(y;x)
=) q(x; z)  q(y; z)q(x; y) and
therefore, we must have q(x; z) = q(x; y)q(y; z).
Step 5. Finally, we argue that . is asymmetric and transitive. As dened, . is
clearly asymmetric and compares any two distinct locations x and y such that q (x; y)
is rational. We show that it is also transitive. Suppose x 6= y 6= z are such that x.y
and y.z. This implies that q(x; y) and q(y; z) are rational numbers. Let q(x; y) = n1
~n1
and q(y; z) = n2
~n2
. Let RM , RL and RK be peak-unanimous and non-overlapping
proles such that p(RM) = x, p(RL) = y and p(RK) = z, and jM j = n1  n2,
jLj = n2  ~n1 and jKj = ~n1  ~n2. Consider the problem (1; (RM ; RL; RK)). We
have jM jjLj = q(x; y) and
jLj
jKj = q(y; z). Since x . y, we have RM  RL and since y . z
we have RL  RK . However,  is almost transitive and therefore, it must be that
RM  RK . This happens only if either jM jjKj > q(x; z) or jM jjKj = q(x; z) and x . z. But
jM j
jKj =
n1
~n1
 n2
~n2
= q(x; y)q(y; z) = q(x; z). So it must be that x . z.
5 Concluding Remarks
Richness: We conclude by illustrating the richness of the class of rules associated
with weighted majoritarian priorities. A simple majoritarian priority (Example 3)
is a weighted majoritarian priority if and only if it uses the same tie-breaking rule
across all indi¤erence classes and this tie-breaking rule is dened by a strict complete
order . on R such that for any n and any peak-unanimous and non-overlapping
proles RL; RK 2 Tn, we have RL n RK () p(RL) . p(RK).11 The same
is true for a two regions majoritarian priority (Example 6), i.e., it is a weighted
majoritarian priority if and only if there exists a strict partial order . on R such
that for any v and any peak-unanimous and non-overlapping proles RL; RK 2 Tv,
we have RL v RK () p(RL).p(RK).12 Thus, in particular, the left majoritarian,
11The corresponding q is such that q(x; y) = 1;8(x; y) 2 R2.
12The corresponding q is such that q(x; y) = 1=x0 if x < x0  y, q(x; y) = x0 if y < x0  x
and q(x; y) = 1 if either x; y < x0 or x; y  x0. Note that if x0 is a rational number, the order B
is complete.
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right majoritarian, left-two-regions majoritarian, and right-two-regions majoritarian
priorities are weighted majoritarian priorities. Similarly, the centralist majoritarian
priority (Example 7) with u such that there exists a decreasing positive function
 (d) such that u (n; d) = n (d), is a weighted majoritarian priority if the same tie-
breaking rule is used across all indi¤erence classes and is dened by a strict partial
order on R.13
Extensions: It is clear from Examples 5 and 8 that dropping either anonymity
or peak-only from the characterization o¤ered in Theorem 3 leads to a non-trivial
enlargement of the class of rules. We o¤er a discussion on this issue in an online
supplement where we also provide some partial characterizations of the classes of
rules obtained when one drops either of the aforementioned axioms, or both.14
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